Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith explains why Trump’s Ukraine–Russia peace plan is a test for the transatlantic alliance

The Trump administration’s new plan to end Russia’s war against Ukraine contains four points concerning NATO, even though the alliance played no part in drafting it. In addition to ruling out membership for Ukraine, the proposal includes provisions stating that NATO will not expand further or station troops in Ukraine, and that it will enter into a dialogue with Russia on security issues, “mediated by the U.S.” On the sidelines of the 2025 Halifax International Security Forum, The Beet editor Eilish Hart asked Ambassador Julianne Smith, the U.S. permanent representative to NATO during the Biden administration, how this peace plan could impact the transatlantic alliance. Their conversation, which took place on November 22, has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

— To start, I’d like to get your reaction to the new peace plan drawn up by Trump envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitriev. What do you make of this proposal? 

— My first reaction was that it’s not particularly serious. It feels amateur-ish and looks very similar to the demands that Russia made to the West, the alliance, and Ukraine in 2021. It has many similarities, and so my [initial] questions were as follows: To what degree have the Ukrainians been consulted? To what degree has Congress been consulted? And to what degree have our closest allies in Europe, the NATO alliance, and the European Union been consulted?

I’m quite sure the answers to all of those questions are either not at all or in a very minimal way. And now the administration has set this very pressing deadline of Thursday for the Ukrainians to take it or leave it. So, it’s a shock, but it is also simultaneously disturbing and disappointing.

— This peace plan includes several points regarding NATO. It says it’s “expected” that “NATO will not expand further” and that “NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.” Wouldn’t these points directly contradict the alliance’s “open door” provision (Article 10)? 

— Absolutely. Russia has been trying to get the alliance to stop enlarging for a very long time. It has opposed NATO’s enlargement policy from day one and accused it of encircling Russian territory. So it’s no surprise that the Russians would insert some sort of provision into this agreement about the alliance getting rid of enlargement. 

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The problem with that proposal is that it is not a decision that Russia gets to weigh in on. Russia does not have a voice or a veto on enlargement. And in fact, enlargement isn’t just something the allies want. Enlargement policy is actually present in the alliance’s original treaty, in Article 10. All 32 alliance members would have to agree to change that article, and there’s no world in which I see that happening. 

— The plan also states that the United States would “mediate” a dialogue between Russia and NATO. What does this say about how the Trump administration sees its relationship to the alliance?

— Well, this is where the inexperience really shines through because it appears, by describing it that way, that some members of the Trump administration do not recognize that the U.S. is actually part of the NATO alliance. Listing the negotiating parties as Russia, NATO, and the United States seems to ignore the fact that the U.S. is still a member and leader of the alliance.

I’m not sure if it was a benign slip-up or accident of some kind, or if it was very intentional, to show that the U.S. position will be separate from the NATO alliance. But I found that particular framing to be troubling because I would prefer the line to read, “NATO and Russia can meet to discuss X, Y, and Z.”

Editor’s note: Hours after this interview took place, U.S. senators at the Halifax Security Forum told journalists that, according to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the leaked 28-point peace plan is essentially Russia’s “wish list” and not the actual U.S. plan. Senator Mike Rounds also said that Rubio “was not aware” of any threats to cut off U.S. weapons or intelligence to Ukraine. Rubio later stated that the peace proposal was authored by the U.S. based on input from both Russia and Ukraine.

— Given the wording of the peace plan and the fact that it was drafted without input from European allies, do you think this proposal could test NATO unity?

— Yes, it will test NATO unity, and I think there are some signs that that’s already happening. We’ve seen the Slovakian prime minister come out in support of the deal. Other allies, such as Poland, have expressed very serious concerns about the viability of this deal and raised objections to some of the document’s key tenets. So this will be somewhat challenging for the alliance to navigate. However, I will say one thing that has surprised me throughout the last almost four years of this war in Ukraine is the ability of the allies to maintain both unity and resolve in supporting Ukraine despite some of the differences that exist across the alliance. So I’m counting on the alliance to maintain that unity and resolve going forward.

— The Trump administration is reportedly pressuring Ukraine to sign the peace proposal by the Thanksgiving holiday or lose U.S. support in the war with Russia. Why do you think the White House is increasing the pressure on Zelensky at this point? And do you get the sense that they are putting pressure on Putin, too? 

— I am a little bit surprised by how quickly this deal bubbled to the surface because the United States just recently imposed sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, which I took as a positive sign that the Trump administration was willing to apply more pressure on Moscow. But this flip gives me cause for concern because the White House now seems unwilling to apply pressure on Moscow. 

I don’t see many points in the plan where Russia is not getting the upper hand or is not succeeding in having its demands met. Surely the Russians do not want the Ukrainians to have any sort of security guarantees, so I imagine they’re not particularly excited about that. But if you look at other points in the plan — reducing the size of Ukraine’s military, Ukraine giving up all of Donbas, ensuring that no NATO troops will ever be positioned in Ukraine, an election in 100 days, no punishment for war criminals — it all favors the Russians. So, I do not read this as an agreement that serves as a compromise. In my mind, it serves only one side, and that is the Russians.

— Do you think the Trump administration would be open to a counter-proposal from Zelensky and European allies? 

— I don’t know. I think Zelensky will have to take this head-on. He will have to lay out the specifics of where he takes issue with different points in the plan, and I think that list would be long. It seems to me like he is going to try to get those messages to the White House through every possible channel. It looks like he’s already had a conversation with the [U.S.] vice president on this matter. I would expect further conversations throughout the weekend and in the days ahead.

Editor’s note: After this interview took place, U.S. President Donald Trump told journalists that the proposed peace plan is “not my final offer” to Ukraine. Asked what would happen if Zelensky refused to accept the plan by the Thursday deadline, Trump replied: “Then he can continue to fight his little heart out.”

The Europeans seem to be meeting at the G20 right now and crafting their response and approach to the White House. I anticipate a flurry of phone calls. I think the open-ended question for all of us is the degree to which the White House is willing to put more time on the clock and listen to all points of view and truly negotiate this, as any administration should, with both parties, not just with one party.

— We’ve seen a string of Russian incursions into NATO airspace in recent months. What effect have these had on the alliance, particularly in the context of this peace process?

— There’s a pretty standard playbook that the Russians use to intimidate NATO allies, to try and drive a wedge through NATO unity, and to try and create uncertainty about NATO’s Article 5 clause (an attack on one is an attack on all). They use different tactics ranging from disinformation and malign influence to economic coercion and clipping undersea cables. And now we’ve seen these incursions into NATO airspace. 

This is a common tactic. It’s a standard play in the playbook; we’ve seen it for years. They appear to be turning up the tempo of those types of incursions. And I think it is cause for concern across the alliance. Allies were proud that Poland was able to scramble F-35s quickly and get jets in the air. But I think they are also willing to admit that having a very expensive capability like the F-35 take out a styrofoam, unarmed drone that maybe [costs] $5,000 to $10,000 is probably not terribly cost-efficient. I think the allies understand that there’s more work to do to protect NATO territory from these types of incidents. But it is not taking the alliance by surprise because we’ve seen these tactics used for literally decades.