‘Menacing, but it changes nothing’ Strategic weapons expert Maxim Starchak answers questions about the experimental ballistic missile system Russia just fired at Ukraine

In a televised national address on November 21, Vladimir Putin made surprisingly detailed comments about Moscow’s response to a series of Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory using Western-made tactical ballistic missiles. The president focused specifically on a Russian attack against the Yuzhmash weapons factory in Dnipro, carried out with the experimental ballistic system known as “Oreshnik.” Beyond Putin’s remarks, very little is known about this weapon.

Meduza spoke to Maxim Starchak — a correspondent for Defense News, an expert on Russian nuclear policy and strategic weapons, and a fellow at the Queen’s University’s Center for International and Defence Policy — to learn more about the origins of “Oreshnik,” its potential strike power, how the United States might respond, and why Putin continues to threaten the West with such terrifying weapons.

— Putin said Russia hit the Yuzhmash facility in Dnipro with an “Oreshnik” missile. What do we know about these missiles, given that they appear to be a new weapon? How does the Oreshnik differ from Rubezh missiles, which Kyiv initially claimed were used in the strike?

— The Pentagon and various experts agree that the Oreshnik is likely a modification of the RS-26 Rubezh missile. The Rubezh was developed in the 2010s but never put into large-scale production.

Russia described the Rubezh as an intercontinental missile, but Western analysts viewed it as a replacement for the medium-range RS-10 Pioneer missile, which would have violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that was in effect at the time of its developmemt.

Now we’re hearing from Putin that this Oreshnik missile has the same medium range. But there’s no evidence [yet to support this claim]. If it is indeed a modification of the Rubezh, the Oreshnik could have an intercontinental range, meaning that Russia is violating the still-active New START treaty.

— Is it true, as Putin claims, that missiles as fast as he described — flying at Mach 10 — are invulnerable to existing missile and air defense systems?

— First, we don’t know if the missile can actually reach such speeds. The Kremlin tends to exaggerate these things.

Second, Moscow itself may not actually know if air defense systems can intercept this missile. These claims remain unsubstantiated without tests or real combat attempts to shoot it down.

— Putin said the missile was “non-nuclear.” Does that mean there’s a nuclear version of the Oreshnik, too? In that case, how big of a threat would we be talking about? Is it possible to estimate the theoretical destructive power of such a weapon?

— The missile can, of course, carry a nuclear warhead. It was assumed that the Rubezh had a range of up to 6,000 kilometers [3,730 miles] and could carry four nuclear warheads with an estimated yield of 300 kilotons each. 

In the Dnipro attack [as seen in the video], you could see seven exploding warheads, though there were likely eight in total. Assuming the mass is roughly the same, it would mean about 150 kilotons each [for theoretical nuclear warheads on an Oreshnik]. Very roughly, this is potentially 10 times more powerful than what was dropped on Hiroshima.

— Putin said the root cause of this current escalation is America’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. What happened in 2019 that led to the U.S. leaving that agreement? Was it a genuinely escalatory step?

— Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, after the development of missile programs in various countries, particularly China, the INF Treaty lost its value for Russia.

Since 2008, the U.S. had suspected Russia of violating the treaty by testing a ground-based cruise missile with a range exceeding 500 kilometers [310 miles]. The Obama administration initially sought to address the issue diplomatically with Moscow, but later, the Trump administration demanded compliance with the treaty, threatening to leave if the violations continued.

In response, Moscow accused the U.S. of deploying the Aegis Ashore ground-based system, which it claimed could launch intermediate-range missiles. With no resolution, the U.S. withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019, and Russia subsequently suspended its participation.

I think Russia wanted to exit the INF Treaty and was actively looking for an excuse to get out. With weaker conventional forces and surrounded by larger armies, the treaty was unfavorable for Moscow. Putin’s statements now are merely an attempt to shift the blame.

— Is it significant that Donald Trump was the U.S. president when they abandoned the INF Treaty? Was Putin maybe criticizing the incoming administration and not the outgoing Biden cabinet?

— Yes, likely, the U.S. might not have withdrawn from the INF Treaty if it had been a Democratic administration, but it wouldn’t have stopped Russia from developing its missile programs, and now we’d be hearing from Putin that the Dnipro strike used an intercontinental-range, not medium-range, missile. And good luck proving otherwise.

It’s doubtful, of course, that Trump heard this speech and concluded that negotiations are in order. More likely, he’s become convinced that Russia was indeed violating the agreements and thinks the U.S. needs to catch up by developing and showcasing similar missiles.

— Where do you see things going from here? Will Putin’s threats be taken seriously? Could the U.S., for example, withdraw its permission for Kyiv to strike Russian territory with ATACMS? Or does further escalation seem like the more realistic scenario?

— I don’t see what has changed after the ballistic missile strike. Russia was already attacking Ukraine with other potential nuclear warhead carriers — missiles like the “Kinzhal,” “Zircon,” X-55, and X-101 — and now they’ve done it with a ballistic missile. Yes, it looks menacing, but it changes nothing.

To have an effect, there would need to be at least hundreds of these missiles. At the moment, there are only a handful — dozens, at best. Building and launching a ballistic missile (in the non-nuclear hypersonic configuration that Putin claimed) is an exceedingly costly affair, and the damage it causes is far less than the cost of the strike itself. The efficiency of such attacks is low, but they generate a lot of noise. And it’s precisely this informational effect that Putin seeks.

— Is there anything like today’s confrontation between Moscow and the West that compares to the history of the Cold War? Or is Putin’s blatant nuclear rhetoric something new?

— There’s a war going on, and Putin is using every possible tactic to reduce Western involvement and achieve his goals. Military exercises, withdrawing from treaties, deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, amending Russia’s military doctrines, the Oreshnik missile — it’s all aimed at instilling fear and influencing current policies. 

These tactical moves agitate the media and the public, raise doubts, and generate fear. The public, in turn, pressures elected politicians in Western countries. Moscow hopes this strategy will work.